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REMEMBERING, FORGETTING, AND 
REWRITING THE PAST: ATHENIAN 
INSCRIPTIONS AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY* 
 
Polly Low 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter explores the ways in which the Athenians responded to inscriptions 
after their creation, and in particular their approaches to the emendation, destruction, and 
recreation of inscribed public texts. It argues that these approaches reveal an ongoing 
interaction between individual initiative and collective authority in the treatment of 
inscribed monuments; and it suggests that this interaction, in turn, offers an important 
insight into the role played by inscribed texts in the shaping and reshaping of Athenian 
collective memory. 
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1. Introduction 
he claim that the inscribed decrees of Classical Athens have some 
sort of commemorative function is, these days, probably not so much 
uncontroversial as positively mundane.1 There is, however, less 
universal agreement about the precise ways in which these inscriptions 
functioned as sites or sources of memory, and it is this issue which I aim to 
 
* My thanks to the editors, for inviting me to contribute both to the seminar series and 
to this volume, and for their very helpful comments and suggestions throughout; I am 
likewise indebted to the anonymous readers of this chapter, and to Simon Hornblower, in 
particular for drawing my attention to a number of useful (Athenian and non-Athenian) 
pieces of evidence. An earlier version of part of this chapter was delivered in a panel on 
‘Creating Collective Memory in the Greek City’ at the 2012 Joint Annual Meeting of the 
Archaeological Institute of America/American Philological Association in Philadelphia. I 
am grateful to Julia Shear for organising the panel, and to the AIA for a generous grant 
towards the cost of attending the conference. I presented some preliminary thoughts on 
some of the material discussed here in Low (2013), and am also therefore grateful to the 
editor of that volume, J. Tumblety, for her assistance in developing my ideas. P. J. Rhodes’ 
detailed analysis of erasures in Greek public inscriptions (Rhodes (2019)) was published when 
this chapter was already in proof, and I have not therefore been able to engage with its 
arguments here; nonetheless, my great debt to Rhodes’ published and unpublished work on 
this topic will, I hope, be clear. 
1 See (as well as Shear’s chapter in this volume), Osborne (1999); Luraghi (2010); Lambert 
(2011); Shear (2012). More generally on the symbolic functions of inscribed texts, see Thomas 
(1989) 45–60. 
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address here. My focus is on the treatment of inscribed monuments after 
their creation: that is, the reasons for which (and ways in which) they were 
destroyed, emended, and occasionally reconstructed. My intention, in part, 
is simply to sketch out the range of things that the Athenians did to their 
inscriptions, and to consider the reasons for their (sometimes apparently 
arbitrary) behaviour. The wider purpose of this chapter, though, is to explore 
what these practices of destruction, erasure, and reconstruction can reveal 
about the role played by inscribed texts in the shaping and reshaping of 
Athenian collective memory. This (collective memory) is a phenomenon for 
which I want to claim two distinguishing features. First, it should be seen as 
an aggregation of individual memories and memory-acts, rather than (as 
‘commemoration’ might imply) something more top-down or centrally 
controlled.2 Second (and as a consequence of the first point): collective 
memory is fluid, and potentially contested, rather than absolutely stable.3 My 
suggestion is that thinking about inscriptions in terms of ‘collective memory’ 
rather than (or as well as) the products of single acts of ‘commemoration’ 
might add to our understanding both of the role of inscriptions in Athenian 
life, and of the nature of collective memory in the ancient city.4 
 Two more specific questions about the mnemonic role of inscriptions run 
through this study. The first relates to the theme—very prominent in recent 
epigraphic scholarship—of the part played by inscriptions (particularly 
inscribed decrees) in shaping a distinctively collective version of the city’s 
past, and above all of its past political decisions.5 Inscribed decrees are 
essentially and necessarily collective, in that their existence depends on an 
act of collective agreement: a decree cannot be inscribed unless it is passed 
by the assembly, and it cannot be passed unless the Athenians, as a group, 
are willing to assent to it. The text of an inscribed decree commemorates a 
particular moment of democratic decision-making, and also marks a point at 
which an individual version of the events which led to the decree being 
passed (preserved in a decree in the form of the proposer’s words, or at least 
 
2 The theory that individual and collective memories are inextricably linked was most 
influentially formulated by Halbwachs (1992 [1925]); see further Assman (2011) 21–69. On 
collective memory in Athenian culture, see now Steinbock (2013). 
3 Helpfully emphasised by Cubbitt (2007) ch. 3. 
4 I have restricted the focus of discussion to Classical Athens partly for reasons of space 
and partly because the density of epigraphic and literary evidence for this period allows (at 
times) for the creation of a fuller picture of the memory landscape of the city than is possible 
for other periods and places. I should emphasise that this focus should not be taken to imply 
a claim that Classical Athenian behaviour was necessarily unique. In what follows, I note 
some non-Athenian examples which are especially useful as comparanda for Athenian 
practice, and which, in general, point to broad similarity between Athenian and non-
Athenian commemorative habits. (Detailed consideration of how these general habits 
influence specific practice, especially in relation to the formation of collective memory, 
would be a subject for one, or several, other papers.) 
5 For examples of this approach, see the works cited above, n. 1. 
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a clause presented as if it were the words of the proposer)6 receives the 
endorsement of the collective. To put this another way: an inscribed decree 
marks the moment where an individual account of the past becomes a part 
of a collectively-agreed narrative. In that respect, these decrees illuminate a 
centrally important, but often extremely elusive, aspect of the formation of 
collective memory: that is, the process by which individual accounts of the 
past become incorporated into a wider, shared version of a community’s 
history.7 Focussing on the moment of an inscribed decree’s creation, 
however, can give the impression that this movement from individual to 
collective was a relatively straightforward process, and one which operated 
in only one direction. I hope to show that the fate of inscribed monuments 
after their creation points to a more complex situation, and that these 
collectively-agreed monuments could continue to influence, and be 
influenced by, individuals’ changing views of the past. 
 This argument will require some consideration of a second theme: how 
do inscribed records (and the ‘collective memory’ which they represent) 
relate to other, particularly unwritten, forms of shared memory? Unwritten 
memories are, of course, by their very nature hard to locate in our sources, 
but it is sometimes possible to identify their traces.8 An epigraphic example 
reported in a literary text can illustrate the point. In his Third Philippic, 
Demosthenes (9.41–5) appeals to the inscription setting out Athenian actions 
against the (alleged) traitor Arthmius of Zeleia, who had been accused of 
conveying Persian gold to Greece during the Persian War, and does so, he 
says, because he wants to provide his audience with ‘not my [Demosthenes’] 
words but the written record of your ancestors’ (οὐ λόγους ἐµαυτοῦ λέγων, 
ἀλλὰ γράµµατα τῶν προγόνων τῶν ὑµετέρων, 9.41). The second-person plural 
is important: the actions which are recorded on the stele can be asserted to 
represent the shared ideology of the whole Athenian people. This is—or 
Demosthenes hopes it can be presented as—a collective record, and it is 
deployed in order to trigger a collective memory of shared actions and shared 
ideals, which in turn can shape the behaviour of the contemporary Athenian 
community.9 This same example, however, serves as a warning against 
assuming that the meaning of monuments was entirely fixed, or that there is 
 
6 On the appearance of verbatim reportage, see Plat. Phaed. 258a4–9; on the gap between 
this and reality, Osborne (1999). 
7 On the methodological challenge of pinning down exactly how the relationship 
between individual and collective memory operates, see (for example) Olick (1999); Crane 
(1997); Green (2004). 
8 For further discussion of the interplay between oral and written records in Athens, see 
Thomas (1989) 45–59. 
9 The question of the commemorative function of the monument is further complicated 
by the fact that both decree and stele might have been fourth-century fabrications: for brief 
discussion (and an argument in favour of authenticity), see Meiggs (1972) 508–12. More 
generally on the phenomenon of collective memory leading to the fabrication of inscriptions 
(the opposite process, in effect, to the one under discussion here), see Habicht (1961). 
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necessarily a direct correlation between the words written on a stele and the 
collective memories which that stele might evoke. The existence of the 
monument is an essential part of Demosthenes’ argument, but it is not 
sufficient in itself. The words quoted by Demosthenes record only the actions 
of the people involved: the treachery of Arthmius; the response of the 
Athenians. The reason for that response—the ‘intention’ of the Athenians—
is (according to Demosthenes) preserved not in the written text, but in the 
shared memory of the audience (9.43): 
 
ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ γράµµατα. λογίζεσθε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, τίς ἦν ποθ’ ἡ διάνοια τῶν 
Ἀθηναίων τῶν τότε, ταῦτα ποιούντων, ἢ τί τὸ ἀξίωµα. 
 
Those are the words. Consider, by the gods, what was the intention of 
the Athenians of that time, or what was their decision? 
 
Admittedly, this is a memory which requires some excavation (and, almost 
certainly, reshaping) by Demosthenes before it re-emerges at the surface of 
Athenian collective consciousness, but it remains the case that it is possible 
for Demosthenes to assert the existence of shared memories which lie outside 
the inscribed text.  
 That inscribed monuments might be used to shape memory but do not 
absolutely determine it is apparent, too, in the fact that this stele is put to 
rather different uses in other contexts. For Demosthenes in the False Embassy 
(19.271–2) the text is evidence not (as it is in the Philippics) of the Athenians’ 
traditional commitment to acting as protectors of the Greek world, but rather 
of their long-standing objection to all forms of corruption or treachery, 
wherever committed. Dinarchus (in his Against Aristogeiton, 2.24–5) uses the 
inscription for a similar purpose, that is, to contrast the strong anti-
corruption stance of fifth-century Athenians with the more lax approach of 
his contemporaries; but he puts a much greater focus on the specific problem 
of bribery (δωροδοκία) than on the all-encompassing charges of treachery 
emphasised by Demosthenes. All three speeches use the inscription to 
validate a version of the past, and to claim that it represents something that 
all Athenians must surely know (even though the event it recorded took place 
long before the lifetime of any member of their audience), but in each speech, 
the version of the past which the inscription is claimed to preserve is subtly 
but crucially different.  
 What this example suggests is that although inscribed monuments might 
have been set up with the intention of fixing a specific, collectively-authorised 
version of the past in the minds of their viewers, this act of collective 
commemoration still allowed space for a wide penumbra of associated 
memories. In what follows, I aim to show that this phenomenon is also visible 
in the epigraphic record itself, and that it can help us to analyse and 
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understand the Athenian approach to destroying, emending, and, occasion-
ally, reconstructing their inscribed public monuments. 
 
 
2. Destruction and its Avoidance 
The underlying principles which guided the Athenian treatment of inscribed 
decrees after their creation seem, at first glance, clear and logical: when a 
monument became outdated, it should be either amended (by additions or 
deletions) or destroyed.10 It is this second option, complete removal of a 
monument, which will be considered first.  
 An apparently clear-cut example of this approach is visible in an alliance 
between Athens and Thessaly of 361/0 (RO 44), which includes as one of its 
conditions the stipulation that a previous treaty between Athens and 
Alexander of Pherae (an enemy of Thessaly) should be removed (lines 39–
40).11 The logic which underpins this action seems to be this: the treaty is no 
longer valid; therefore the stone which records it should be destroyed. This 
approach can be seen elsewhere too. Demosthenes, for example, in his 
speech For the Megalopolitans asserts that the Megalopolitans should destroy 
the stelae marking their alliance with Thebes, and by doing so repudiate the 
treaty (16.27–8). According to Philochorus, Demosthenes himself persuaded 
the Athenian assembly to pass a decree authorising preparations for war with 
Macedon, part of which included the provision to ‘take down the stele which 
established peace and alliance with Philip’ (BNJ 328 F 55a: τὴν µὲν στήλην 
καθελεῖν τὴν περὶ τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνης καὶ συµµαχίας σταθεῖσαν). 
Plutarch (Per. 30.1) makes a Spartan ambassador to Athens, told by Pericles 
that revocation (and destruction) of the Megarian decrees was prevented by 
law (nomos), suggest the alternative strategy of simply turning the inscribed 
stele to face the wall.12 
 Physical evidence for complete destruction of inscriptions is hard to pin 
down, for obvious reasons: almost all extant inscriptions were either taken 
down or simply fell down at some point between their erection and their 
 
10 The fullest discussion of the question (focussing on the treatment of inscribed treaties) 
is Bolmarcich (2007), who also lists some earlier studies (477 n. 2). See, in addition, Rhodes 
(2001) 136–9 and (2019); Pébarthe (2006) 261–3; Culasso Gastaldi (2003) and (2010). 
11 The verb used is here καθαιρέω, which appears to be the regular term for removal of 
an inscribed stele, used in both epigraphic and literary sources, and in non-Athenian as well 
as Athenian texts (e.g., from early fourth-century Thasos, IG XII.8 264, lines 12–13). Less 
common is ἀναιρέω (e.g., Andoc. 1.103; RO 83, γ, lines 24–5). 
12 The nature of this alleged nomos is unclear: Bolmarcich (2007) 479–80, suggests that it 
might indicate the existence of a general law forbidding the removal of inscriptions (except 
under certain specified circumstances). It is perhaps more likely that Plutarch is referring 
(imprecisely) to a specific regulation, possibly an entrenchment clause, prohibiting the 
revocation of this particular decree: compare the clauses in ML 49/OR 142, lines 20–5; RO 
22, lines 51–63; see Stadter (1989) ad loc. 
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modern rediscovery; only rarely can we establish whether an inscription was 
deliberately removed, still less pinpoint the precise moment of its destruction. 
One possible (albeit non-Athenian) example is the Delphian decree which 
records honours for Aristotle and Callisthenes (RO 80). This was passed in a 
fit of Macedon-pleasing enthusiasm some time between 337 and 327; we 
know that these honours were rescinded after Alexander’s death (Ael. VH 
14.1), and we also know that the surviving fragment of this inscription was 
found in a well. The context in which it was found is not securely dated, but 
the temptation to assume that the annulment of the honour and the 
destruction of the inscription go together is almost irresistible.13 Returning to 
Athens (although also to a slightly later period), we could note the case of 
Agora 16.114, a decree praising the activities of Demetrius Poliorcetes, which 
seems to have fallen victim to the widespread damnatio memoriae carried out 
by the Athenians against the Antigonids in 200 or 199 BCE.14 Livy (31.44.4–5) 
reports that the Athenians decreed that all references to Philip V and his 
ancestors were to be removed; this inscription was discovered in a cistern, in 
a context which can be fairly safely dated to c. 200 BCE.15 
 This pattern of evidence seems to fit quite comfortably with the views 
(outlined above) of the purpose of inscriptions. If an inscribed monument 
functions as the physical embodiment of the collective decision of the 
Athenians, then it logically follows that a reversal of that decision should 
entail the removal of the monument. It might even be argued that the process 
of cause and effect should be seen as operating in the opposite direction: that 
is, it is not revoking an agreement that requires the removal of a monument, 
but the removal of the monument that formalises the annulment of an 
agreement. Or perhaps the two processes are incapable of being 
disentangled, something suggested by Demosthenes’ comments in the Against 
Leptines (20.36–7). It would be disgraceful, according to Demosthenes, for the 
Athenians to leave standing inscriptions (στήλας) whose terms they no longer 
intended to keep; and it would be disgraceful for them to breach an 
agreement (συνθήκας) which was still in force: αὗται γὰρ οὑτωσὶ τοῖς 
βουλοµένοις κατὰ τῆς πόλεως βλασφηµεῖν τεκµήριον ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν 
ἑστήξουσιν (‘for when people wish to bad-mouth our city, there those things 
will stand, as proof that they speak the truth’, 20.37). It is hard to tell whether 
Demosthenes is referring (in αὗται) to the stelae or to the sunthekai (both are 
feminine plural). My suspicion is that this ambiguity would be unproblematic 
for Demosthenes; indeed that it is positively helpful for his argument here. 
 
13 RO, p. 395. FD III.1 400 (at pp. 240–1) notes in addition that the same well also 
contained fragments of a bronze plaque, listing names of some individuals expelled from 
Delphi during the Third Sacred War (CID 2.73), and speculates that this inscription too 
might have been disposed of once these men were able to return to Delphi after 346 BCE. 
14 See below, p. 245. 
15 Young (1951) 226. See Shear, below, Ch. 7, for detailed discussion of the erasure made 
by the Athenians in the decree of Phaedrus of Sphettus (IG II2 682) in 200 BCE. 
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The inscribed monument should be a physical manifestation both of 
Athenian ideals and of Athenian practice, and no gap should be allowed to 
develop between monument and reality. 
 But this picture of neat correlation between Athens’ commemorative 
epigraphic landscape and its practical political commitments is both 
incomplete and misleadingly tidy. In fact, a closer look at one of the examples 
already mentioned reveals this: that is, the Athenian alliance with Thessaly, 
and the clause stipulating the removal of the stele recording the treaty with 
Alexander of Pherae. The alliance, as noted above, was decreed in 361/0, 
but by this point Athens had already been fighting Alexander for some time: 
the alliance between Alexander and Athens was made in 368; in 364 
Alexander shifted his allegiance to Thebes; by 362 and 361 he was attacking 
Athenian allies and Athenian ships, and even staged a raid on Piraeus.16 It 
was not, however, until the treaty with Thessaly was made in 361/0 that the 
Athenians got round to removing the treaty with Alexander, even though 
that treaty cannot have had any formal force for several years.  
 It is, though, possible to see the logic behind this approach too. Since 
(according to our sources, at least) it was Alexander who had broken the 
treaty, and since there was generally a diplomatic benefit to be had from 
claiming to be the victim, rather than the instigator, of any interstate quarrel, 
it would presumably have been quite helpful for the Athenians to be able to 
point to a tangible marker of the disloyalty of their (former) ally. 
Demosthenes’ comments in the Against Leptines, noted above, point to an 
awareness of the potential embarrassment which could arise if too great a 
disjunction was allowed to emerge between monument and action, and a 
desire to exploit that potential for embarrassment, and to focus it on a 
foreign-policy rival, might well underlie the Athenian treatment of this treaty 
stele. 
 A similar approach is clearly visible in the case of the stele recording the 
Peace of Nicias, where Thucydides reports that the Athenians, learning that 
the Spartans had violated a clause of the agreement, ‘were persuaded by 
Alcibiades to inscribe at the bottom of the Laconian pillar that the 
Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths’ (Ἀλκιβιάδου πείσαντος τῇ µὲν 
Λακωνικῇ στήλῃ ὑπέγραψαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνέµειναν οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι τοῖς ὅρκοις, 
5.56.3). It is worth noting here not only Athens’ (Alcibiades-inspired) 
eagerness to memorialise Spartan duplicity, but also the fact that (in 
Thucydides’ narration at least) the Athenians, as soon as they have accused 
the Spartans of breaking their oaths, go on to do exactly the same thing 
themselves by assisting the helots in an anti-Spartan action. Their (unilateral) 
addition to the text of the treaty seems to be an implicit statement that the 
whole agreement is now void. Nevertheless, the whole monument was left 
standing, not because it was a forgotten irrelevance, but precisely because its 
 
16 Theban alliance: Diod. 15.80.6; attacks on Athens and her allies: Xen. Hell. 6.4.35, 
[Dem.] 50.4, Diod. 15.95.  
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lack of formal validity gave it greater symbolic power, symbolism which 
could then (we might reasonably imagine) be deployed to help justify future 
hostility to Sparta.17 
 These two examples seem to reflect two rather different approaches to 
marking a treaty violation, with correspondingly different implications for 
our understanding of the commemorative function of the inscribed 
monuments and, more particularly, the relationship between written com-
memoration and other forms of collective memory. If the Athenians were 
making a deliberate point by leaving the Alexander treaty standing after it 
had been broken (by Alexander), then the fact that this was not noted on the 
stone must suggest a wider (unwritten) awareness of the diplomatic history of 
the two states. (That is: this would not be much of an insult if the average 
viewer of this inscription in, say, 361, had no idea what Alexander had been 
up to in the past few years). This seems similar to the view of inscriptions 
implied by Demosthenes’ use of the decree condemning Arthmius of Zeleia: 
the inscribed monument provides a springboard for the collective memory 
of an event, or series of events, but it does not tell the complete story. 
However, the decision in the case of the Peace of Nicias to mark in writing 
the treaty-breaching behaviour of the Spartans suggests the possibility of a 
rather different approach to the commemoration of such behaviour, an 
approach which gives greater priority to fixing, if not the full story, then the 
significant parts of it, in public, written, and collectively-agreed form. 
 The element of collective agreement deserves emphasis, in this case and 
in the other examples discussed so far. Thucydides credits Alcibiades with 
the original idea of emending the text, but also makes it clear that he had to 
persuade the Athenians to agree to it; in Aristophanes’ brief allusion to the 
same story (Lysistrata 513–14), all the credit—or blame—for the decision to 
emend the treaty is given to the ecclesia. In the same way, the stele recording 
the treaty with Alexander was removed once the Athenian assembly has 
agreed that this could, and should, be done (RO 44, lines 39–40); it was a 
decree of the assembly (rather than the unilateral decision of Demosthenes) 
which led to the removal of the stele of the Peace of Philocrates.18 If, therefore, 
creating an inscribed monument required that the whole community (as 
 
17 Maria Fragoulaki has observed (pers. com.) that Spartan duplicity recurs as a theme of 
(Thucydides’ picture) of Athenian policy-making in the claims which the Athenian generals 
make in the Melian Dialogue: ‘of all the people we know, the Spartans are most blatant at 
equating comfort with honour, and self-interest with justice’ (5.105). 
18 Noted by Bolmarcich (2007) 485, who argues that such a decision should be seen as 
exceptional (and that treaty-stelae would usually be considered inviolable, and left standing 
even when entirely outdated). Bolmarcich is quite right to note that it is hard to find parallel 
examples of explicit instructions for removal of treaty-stelae; however, Athenian practice in 
emending and erasing parts of these documents (discussed below) suggests to me that they 
were more willing than Bolmarcich allows to tamper with existing monuments. That is, I 
suspect that the practice of removing treaty-stelae after a decision of the assembly was more 
widespread than the extant evidence reveals. 
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embodied by the ecclesia) was prepared to endorse the version of the past 
which it represented, these examples indicate that this element of consensus 
continued to be important during the monument’s afterlife. The fate of the 
Nicias stele suggests that acts of emendation operated in the same way, 
although consideration of some other examples of emendation and erasure 
will show that Athenian behaviour is not always quite so easy to explain or 
understand. 
 
 
3. Erasure and Emendation 
Two problems complicate any attempt to understand Athenian attitudes to 
emending inscribed monuments. First: Athenian habits seem to be not 
entirely consistent. Second, it is not completely clear what the intention of 
such acts of erasure was. Some emendations or erasures are quite obviously 
entirely pragmatic, designed to correct an error in either the drafting or 
cutting of a document;19 other examples might be best explained as resulting 
from a desire to save money (and perhaps time) by updating existing 
documents rather than constructing a new monument from scratch.20 But in 
other cases, particularly where a text is emended some time after its original 
creation, it becomes harder to establish how far Athenian behaviour is driven 
by a practical desire to ensure the accuracy of the monumental record, and 
how great a role might be played by other, more symbolic, aspects of 
commemorative practice. 
 These problems can be illustrated by a well-known example: the 
‘Prospectus’ of the Second Athenian League (RO 22), a monument which 
has a notoriously complex epigraphic afterlife. The text, which was set up in 
 
19 E.g., RO 31 (Athenian decrees for Mytilene; 369/8–368/7): the first decree on the 
stone (lines 8–34) has been re-inscribed over an erasure, probably in order to include an 
amendment (lines 31–4) which had been mistakenly omitted from the first version (RO 
comm. ad loc; Nolan (1981) 126–8). Compare also RO 48 (Athenian alliance with Carystus, 
357/6); the name of the general Chabrias has been erased from the list of generals charged 
with swearing the treaty oath (line 20), perhaps because he died or was deposed before he 
could swear; perhaps because his name was inscribed twice in error (another man, whose 
name also began Χα…, was listed in the incomplete line 20). Discussion of the possibilities, 
and further bibliography, in RO, pp. 240–1. 
20 E.g., the treaties for Rhegion (ML 63/OR 149A) and Leontini (ML 64/OR 149B). In 
both these cases, the original prescript has been erased and re-inscribed; the extant 
prescripts are firmly dated to 433/2, but the exact nature of their relationship to the substan-
tive text below remains unclear. ML (commentary ad locc.) sets out the conventional view 
that the main text of the decree records the original treaty (agreed in perhaps the 440s); 
when the treaty was renewed or reaffirmed in 433/2, the prescript was amended to reflect 
this. An alternative view dates the main text to 433/2, and suggests that the prescript was 
re-inscribed (but not substantially updated) at a later point (Mattingly (1963) 272; Papazar-
kadas (2009) 75). Whichever interpretation is correct, the motivation for the erasure and re-
inscription seems to be driven by practicality (and perhaps also a desire to minimise the cost 
of stone and labour) rather than any wider commemorative agenda (cf. Raviola (1993) 96). 
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378/7, includes an explicit provision that it should be kept up to date by the 
addition of new members to the stone (lines 69–72), and this surely suggests 
that the initial intention (at least) was that the stone act as an accurate record 
of Athens’ diplomatic obligations.21 That impression is reinforced by the fact 
that the text was updated not only by additions but also by deletions: the 
name of one ally seems to have been removed from the list (at line 111);22 
more strikingly, so too was a clause (lines 12–15) which made it clear that the 
new alliance would operate within the framework of the King’s Peace. This 
latter deletion should probably be dated to 367 (or later): this is when 
Athenian policy shifted towards hostility to Persia, and it makes sense that a 
public expression of tolerance of Persian authority might be seen as 
misleading, not to mention unhelpful, after this date.23 
 But the problem in understanding the afterlife of this monument lies not 
so much in what the Athenians did to the stone, as in what they failed to do, 
in terms both of additions and deletions. At some point in the late 370s 
(before the stone was full) names of allies were no longer added to the list.24 
 
21 Compare ML 87/OR 185 (Athenian treaty with Selymbria, c. 408/7), which includes 
(at lines 38–41) an instruction to delete names of hostages from a list (the hostages 
presumably having been taken to ensure Selymbrian co-operation until the treaty was 
agreed, and now having served their purpose). The verb used is ἐξαλείφω, ‘wipe out’, which 
might suggest that the list was on wood, or some other temporary medium, rather than stone 
(compare the examples given by Fischer (2003) 247). ἐκκολάπτω, ‘carve out’, is more 
commonly used of emendations to inscribed texts: e.g., IG I3 106, lines 21–3: τὰ δὲ περὶ 
Τιµάνθος γεγρα|[µµένα] ἐʖν πόλει ἐκκολαφ[σ]άντον Bοι ταµίαι Bοι τCς θεD ἐκ τCς στ|[έλες· (‘the 
Treasurers of the Goddess should carve out from the stele on the Acropolis those things which 
are written about Timanthes’); the nature of what was written, or why it now needed to be 
erased, is unclear: for brief discussion, see Walbank (1978) 432. 
22 The name erased has often been thought to be Ἰάσων: see, e.g., IG II2 43, following a 
suggestion made by Fabricius (1891) 594, and followed by many since: notably Accame (1941) 
91–3; Tod 123. Epigraphic objections to the restoration are stated most influentially by 
Woodhead (1957), and accepted by (e.g.) Cargill (1981) 43–4; Baron (2006) (the latter arguing 
that the erasure is most likely to be a correction of a stone-cutter’s error rather than the 
result of defection from the League; Mitchel (1984) takes a similar view on the reasons for 
the erasure, though a different one on the question of what was erased). 
23 Xen. HG 7.1.33–40; Ryder (1965) 81–2; Cargill (1981) 31–2. Accame (1941) 149–50 and 
Cawkwell (1973) 60 n. 1 both suggest that the erasure should be dated to 375; Marshall (1905) 
16–17 argues that the clause was removed in 369. (Accame’s argument was based on a belief 
that the erasure contained a reference to the King’s Peace, which became embarrassing 
when, in 375, Athens made peace without reference to the King; both Cawkwell and 
Marshall believed that the erasure contained a critical reference to the Spartans, which 
became inappropriate when the Athenian policy to Sparta became more friendly, whether 
in 375/4 or 369.) 
24 The last name on the list (lines 131–4, on the left face of the stele: the demos of Zacynthus 
at Nellos) might not have been the last entry inscribed on the stone: it has been noted that 
this entry, which is separated from, and in a different hand than, those above the last names 
on the list, is aligned with the start of the list of league members on the front face of the stone 
(at lines 79ff.), and was probably originally intended to be grouped with it (Woodhead (1957) 
371 n. 15, developed by Cawkwell (1963) 88; see most recently Baron (2006) 381–2). The cities 
 Remembering, Forgetting, and Rewriting the Past  245 
 
Even harder to explain is the approach taken to deletions from the stone, 
and in particular the fact that a reference to Athenian (and allied) hostility to 
Sparta was not erased, even though Athens and Sparta entered into an 
alliance in 369 BCE.25 This change in policy pre-dates the shift in attitude to 
Persia which is thought to provoke the erasure from lines 12–15, which makes 
it extremely hard to argue that the failure to update the inscribed text 
indicates nothing more than that the stele had been completely forgotten by 
the early 360s. If the stone was still prominent enough to be worth altering 
in 367, it is hard to claim that it was irrelevant in 369. Nor does it seem likely 
that the shift in policy was thought too trivial to be worth noting (or rather, 
in this instance, concealing), since there is good evidence (again in inscribed 
form: RO 31) that Athens’ policy of détente with Sparta had indeed caused 
considerable annoyance among the allies, and required Athens to produce 
some (not entirely convincing) diplomatic special pleading. What, then, is 
going on? 
 In attempting to answer that question, it is useful to pause to think more 
carefully about both the practicalities and the implications of these acts of 
erasure. This subject has most commonly been addressed in the context of 
damnatio memoriae; studies of the memory politics of this practice have, rightly, 
emphasised that this sort of (large-scale) obliteration should be seen not so 
much as an attempt to obliterate memory entirely as to transform honorific 
commemoration into a form of visible denigration. That is: the power of an 
act of damnatio relies, at least in part, on the viewer of a monument being able 
to supplement the gaps in an inscription with their own knowledge of what 
those gaps had once contained, and the reasons why the text had been 
removed.26 This approach does work very well in explaining some Athenian 
erasures, most notably the case (already briefly mentioned) of the Hellenistic 
damnatio of the Antigonids. As has been seen,27 one inscription (Agora 16.114, 
an honorific decree) was taken down completely as part of this process 
(presumably because deleting all the Antigonid references on it would have 
left an almost entirely empty stone). In other cases, though, the Athenians 
carefully removed only the specific references to the Antigonids; the process 
was systematic, targeted, and (as Byrne has shown) almost certainly carried 
out by only two or three stone-cutters (each, it seems, assigned to work in a 
specific area of the city).28 In this case, the explanation of erasure-as-
 
listed in lines 112–30, most likely to be the last inscribed on the stone, probably joined the 
League (and were therefore, presumably, added to the inscription) in either 375 (suggested 
by, e.g., RO 22; Cawkwell (1981) 42–5) or 373 (Tod 123; Baron (2006) 388–90). c. 58 states 
were listed on the stele; Diod. 15.30.2 says that 70 states joined the League; Aeschin. 2.70 
claims 75. 
25 Xen. Hell. 7.1.1–14, Diod. 15.67.1; on the date, see Jehne (1994) 79, n. 190. 
26 See, generally, Flower (2006), esp. 17–34 on memory sanctions in the Greek world. 
27 Above, p. 240. 
28 Byrne (2010). 
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conspicuous-insult works well, and is neatly supported by the fact that 
references to the Antigonids which were already hostile were left in place, 
most notably in the honours for Callias of Sphettus (IG II3 1, 911) and for the 
comic poet Philippides (IG II3 1, 857).29 
 If we move back to the Classical period, such clear-cut examples of 
damnatio become harder to find, although two possible candidates are worth 
considering. First, and more briefly: IG II2 1606, a naval catalogue of 374/3, 
which includes six mentions of the Athenian commander Timotheus (lines 
12, 25, 30, 70, 75, 87). When the list was initially inscribed, Timotheus had 
been elected General, and this title followed each mention of his name. In 
the late summer or autumn of 373, however, Timotheus was charged with 
treason, impeached, and dismissed from his post; presumably in response to 
this, all six mentions of his being general have been excised from the 
inscription, although his name remains untouched.30 Timotheus’ disgrace is, 
then, visibly (and repeatedly) marked in this text, although the Athenians’ 
desire to maintain a comprehensive record of their naval operations seems 
to have prevented them from removing all trace of his original presence from 
the stone.31  
 A second, more complicated, example is the stele which records two 
honorific decrees for the people of Neapolis (ML 89/OR 187). The first 
decree (passed in 409, and first both chronologically and in its position on 
the stone) praised the Neapolitans for their loyalty to Athens, and originally 
noted (in line 7) that they remained allies although they were colonists of the 
Thasians (who were then in revolt against Athens). The second decree 
(probably passed in 407) includes, among other things, a request that this 
description be removed (lines 58–60); the amendment has duly—and quite 
visibly—been carried out in the first decree. Even the most absent-minded 
reader of the text would, I think, be hard-pressed to miss the fact that the 
reference to Thasos as the mother-city of the Neapolitans had been 
deliberately suppressed in the first decree, since this fact is made absolutely 
clear in the second decree. What is much harder to tell, though, is whether 
this visible act of erasure was intended to emphasise the Neapolitans’ hostility 
to the Thasians, or was just a result of an Athenian secretary failing to think 
through the consequences of his actions. The interpretation of the signifi-
cance of the erasure depends at least in part on the equally uncertain 
question of the exact implications of advertising (or suppressing) this mother-
city/colony connection. Is the colonial relationship to be thought of as 
something oppressive, from which the Neapolitans could celebrate their 
 
29 For Callias of Sphettus (IG II3 1, 911), see Shear, below, ch. 7. 
30 For details of the charges and outcome, see Hansen (1975) no. 80. I am grateful to P. 
J. Rhodes to drawing this example to my attention. 
31 It is worth noting that impeachment was no bar to being held to account in other 
respects too: Dem. 49.25 indicates that Timotheus would still have been liable to euthuna at 
the end of the year.  
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liberation? If so, the visibility of the removal of the Thasians could reasonably 
be seen as a good thing: this would be a tangible symbol of the emancipation 
of the Neapolitans from Thasian control.32 Or is it more likely that the 
Neapolitans might be slightly uneasy at being commemorated as an 
ungrateful daughter-city, a state which had betrayed its conventional 
obligations to its metropolis?33 In that case, it would become harder to argue 
that viewers of the stone were intended to read too much into the 
conspicuous erasure of the Neapolitans’ mother city: their removal from the 
stone will have created, or have been intended to create, not an absent 
presence, but simply and straightforwardly an absence. 
 With these (admittedly inconclusive) examples in mind, it is possible to 
return to the problem of the erasure (and absence of erasure) in the 
Prospectus of the Second Athenian League. It would certainly be possible to 
construct an argument which claimed that viewing and explaining erasures 
in terms of deliberate ‘memory sanction’ (rather than simply pragmatic acts 
of record keeping) might help explain why the Persians were expunged from 
this inscription while the Spartans were left in place: there might be no 
particular harm in viewers of this monument being reminded of Athens’ 
extrication of the League from Persian influence; but removing, and thereby 
emphasising the absence of, a policy of hostility to Sparta might have been a 
less obviously desirable move. But I would not want to push this argument 
too far: not every act of erasure was so loaded in its intention; indeed, as has 
already been seen, it is possible that RO 22 itself includes an erasure which 
simply removed the name of a state which had somehow ended up being 
included twice in the list of allies.34 Whatever is driving the Athenian 
treatment of this stone (and of other inscribed monuments), it is not, in my 
view, a coherent, consistent, commemorative agenda. 
 Athenian behaviour may have been inconsistent, but it was not 
necessarily illogical. Once more, the role of collective consensus deserves 
attention; not because it provides a single key to understanding Athenian 
erasing habits, but because it might explain why it is hard to find one. I have 
already suggested, when looking at examples of destruction of inscriptions, 
that Athenian behaviour seems most often to be reactive rather than 
systematic, triggered by specific developments which, first, remind the 
Athenians—or perhaps better, one Athenian (the process starts with an 
individual proposer)—of the existence of certain (or a certain set of) 
 
32 Suggested by Wilhelm (1903) 777, and more recently by Smarczyk (1986) 34; Brunet 
(1997) 237. 
33 The more generally held view, suggested by (e.g.) Graham (1971) 86–7. Graham follows 
Pouilloux (1954) 178–92, in suggesting that IG XII.5 109 is an agreement between Thasos 
and Neapolis and should be dated sometime between 411 and 407; if this is correct then it 
would make it even more likely that the Neapolitans would, in 407, wish to downplay any 
record of their brief burst of hostility to their mother-city. 
34 See above, n. 22. 
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inscriptions, and then prompt them (or him) to realise that the things 
recorded in those monuments would be best removed from the collective 
record. Furthermore, that action is itself collectively endorsed: each act of 
destruction, and each act of emendation or deletion, required the approval 
of the demos. To the examples of the treaty with Alexander, the Peace of 
Philocrates, and the Peace of Nicias we can now add the ones considered 
here: the Prospectus of the Second Athenian League authorised its own 
emendation (in certain cases); the honours for the Neapolitans were altered 
only after the approval of a specific request from the honorands.35 
Conversely, unauthorised alteration of inscriptions can be presented as 
highly problematic, as can be seen in Demosthenes’ outrage at Androtion’s 
(allegedly) illicit decision to melt down some inscribed dedications from the 
Acropolis (Dem. 22.70, 72): 
 
τὰ µὲν οὖν πόλλ’ ὧν λέγων ὑµᾶς ἐφενάκιζεν παραλείψω· φήσας δ’ ἀπορρεῖν 
τὰ φύλλα τῶν στεφάνων καὶ σαπροὺς εἶναι διὰ τὸν χρόνον, ὥσπερ ἴων ἢ 
ῥόδων ὄντας, ἀλλ’ οὐ χρυσίου, συγχωνεύειν ἔπεισεν. … καὶ µήν, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου σκέψασθ’ ὡς καλὰ καὶ ζηλώτ’ 
ἐπιγράµµατα τῆς πόλεως ἀνελὼν ὡς ἀσεβῆ καὶ δείν’ ἀντεπιγέγραφεν.  
 
I will pass over most of what he said to deceive you; but, by alleging that 
the leaves of the crowns were rotten with age and falling off—as though 
they were violet leaves or rose leaves, not made of gold—he persuaded 
you to melt them down … Again, men of Athens, consider those fine 
and enviable inscriptions that he has wiped out forever, and the strange 
and impious inscriptions that he has written in their place. 
 
At least part of Androtion’s crime, according to Demosthenes, lies in the fact 
that he acted without the informed consent of the Athenian people: the 
agreement of the community was secured for the act of erasure and re-
inscription, but under false pretences; Androtion has therefore in effect acted 
unilaterally, and this is what makes his behaviour unacceptable. Similarly, 
Euxitheus (the speaker of Demosthenes 57, Against Eubulides) complains that 
a group of his enemies have (unilaterally, he implies) ‘chiselled out the decree 
(τὸ ψήφισµ’ ἐκκολάψαντες) which the demesmen passed in my honour’ in an 
attempt to undermine his claim to be an Athenian citizen; meanwhile, 
Euxitheus claims, his enemies have argued that he was responsible for 
 
35 Cf. also ML 87/OR 185, IG I3 106 (above, n. 21). This process of authorised emendation 
is visible outside Athens too: compare, for example, IG XII.2 1, a treaty establishing a 
monetary union between Mytilene and Phocaea; the text includes (at lines 1–4) a clause 
which allows both parties to amend the agreement, by amending (by addition or deletion) 
the stele: ὄττι]|[δέ κε αἰ] πόλις [ἀµ]φότ[εραι . . . . . . . . . .]|[ . . . . .] γράφωισι εἰς τὰ[ν στάλαν ἢ 
ἐκκ]|[ολάπ]τωισι, κύ[ρ]ιον ἔστω (‘whatever each polis [sc. by mutual agreement] writes on or 
removes from the stele, let it be valid’. 
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vandalising the inscription himself. The one possibility that Euxitheus does 
not want to entertain is that the emendation to the decree might have been 
properly authorised by the deme as a whole, because that, in turn, might 
suggest that the deme had already endorsed a version of history which 
Euxitheus is arguing against in this speech: one in which he was not a true 
member of the deme, and therefore not an Athenian citizen.36 
 Legitimate changes to a monument relied, therefore, on a combination of 
individual initiative and collective agreement, and bearing that in mind 
might make it easier to explain why the outcomes of that process might 
sometimes appear inconsistent. To return (for the last time) to the 
troublesome Spartans of RO 22: we might want to explain their persistence 
with reference either to a lack of individual interest (that is: for whatever 
reason, no Athenian thought it worth standing up in the assembly to suggest 
chiselling out this clause) or lack of collective agreement about the merits 
(practical or symbolic) of re-writing the past in this way. We can only 
speculate about the reasons why the Athenians decided to act, or to fail to 
act, as they did: did the political context not call for it? Or were they 
influenced by the realisation that removing this clause—and with it a large 
chunk of the motivation formula—might have made the decree simply too 
lacunose to make sense? Our speculations are further hampered by the fact 
that we cannot be sure at which point the process stalled (was a proposal 
never made, or was a proposal made but rejected?). What we should 
probably be careful about doing, though, is assuming that our inability to 
reconstruct the logic behind the treatment of a text necessarily means that 
such a logic never existed. 
 
 
4. Reconstruction 
This final section will consider a third way in which the Athenians reshaped 
the epigraphic record of their past: the re-creation of destroyed monuments. 
It will focus on a set of examples which are all connected with the oligarchic 
revolution (and democratic counter-revolution) of 404/3, and the after-
effects of those events.37 This material provides some of the best epigraphic 
evidence for the ways in which the commemorative function of an inscribed 
 
36 The case of the Serpent Column is also worth considering as a non-Athenian example 
which demonstrates (at least an Athenian assumption of) similar attitudes to licit and illicit 
emendation of inscriptions: in this case, accounts of the monument’s history report both 
unauthorised (and problematic) inscription (Pausanias’ addition of an epigram praising his 
own achievements) and subsequent ‘official’ erasures and additions, authorised by the 
Spartans (in Thucydides’ version: 1.132) or the Delphic Amphictiony (according to [Dem.] 
59.98; note that, in [Demosthenes’] account, the initiative came from the Plataeans, who 
then persuaded the Amphictiony to take action: a similar process, that is, to the one we have 
seen in Athenian contexts). On the nature (and authorship) of the (real) inscriptions on the 
Serpent Column, see Steinhart (1997) 53–69. 
37 Thoroughly discussed by Shear (2011). 
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decree might shift over time and in different contexts. It also illustrates once 
more the ways in which inscriptions can be viewed as records of a set of 
individual responses to past events, set in a collectively-endorsed 
commemorative context. Where this material differs from that considered so 
far is that it reveals much more clearly the extent to which individuals could 
shape both the process of commemoration and its monumental outcome. 
 The story starts with a flurry of epigraphic destruction, carried out by the 
oligarchic regime of the Thirty Tyrants (404/3 BCE). The Thirty’s 
inscription-destroying tendencies are quite well known: as will be seen, they 
are attested in the epigraphic record, and they are also alluded to in the 
Aristoteleian Athenaion Politeia’s account of their constitutional and legislative 
reforms (Ath. Pol. 35.2): 
 
τὸ µὲν οὖν πρῶτον µέτριοι τοῖς πολίταις ἦσαν καὶ προσεποιοῦντο διώκειν 
τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, καὶ τούς τ’ Ἐφιάλτου καὶ Ἀρχεστράτου νόµους 
τοὺς περὶ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν καθεῖλον ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, καὶ τῶν Σόλωνος 
θεσµῶν ὅσοι διαµφισβητήσεις ἔσχον, καὶ τὸ κῦρος ὃ ἦν ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς 
κατέλυσαν, ὡς ἐπανορθοῦντες καὶ ποιοῦντες ἀναµφισβήτητον τὴν πολιτείαν. 
 
At first, therefore, they were moderate to the citizens and pretended to 
be implementing the ancestral constitution, and they removed from the 
Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus about the 
Areopagites, and also those regulations of Solon which were disputed, 
and they abolished the sovereignty of the jurymen, claiming to be 
rectifying the constitution and making it unambiguous. 
 
The author suggests that the Thirty represented their removal of the 
inscribed laws as a purely administrative move,38 but it is hard to imagine 
that this act of destruction was not also intended to have a wider, symbolic 
function: by removing these monuments of (a certain version of) the 
Athenian past, the Thirty cleared the way for the development of a version 
of that past which better suited their own ideological agenda. The same 
motivation can be ascribed to the Thirty’s other significant act of epigraphic 
destruction: the removal of a number of inscriptions which recorded awards 
of proxenia to favoured non-Athenians.39 The removal of these inscriptions 
 
38 Osborne (2003) 264–5 makes the case for taking seriously the Thirty’s claim to be 
implementing a serious programme of legislative reform (on the specifics of which, see 
Rhodes (1993) ad loc.; Wallace (1989) 131–44); but a practical purpose and a wider symbolic 
intention are not mutually exclusive. 
39 Six examples are relatively secure: IG I3 229 (≈ IG II2 9); IG II2 6, 52, 66c; Agora 16.37 
and 39. (Further details of these inscriptions can conveniently be found in Lambert (2012) 
266–7). IG I3 227 (≈ IG II2 8), IG I3 228 (≈ IG II2 32), and perhaps ML 80/OR 173 (see below, 
n. 46) were also re-inscribed in the early fourth century, but in these cases it is not clear from 
the extant text whether the original decrees were destroyed by the Thirty or were being 
replaced for some other reason (see below, p. 253). 
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might have symbolised the abnegation of the privileges which they 
conferred,40 but what is more certain is that their destruction contributes to 
a reshaping of the Athenian commemorative landscape. We should note not 
only the content of these decrees (markers of Athens’ interventionist, and 
imperialist, foreign policy),41 but also their location: Lambert has suggested 
that the placement of honorific decrees on the Acropolis should be seen as a 
deliberate attempt to make them part of the landscape of power, wealth, and 
prestige created by the building projects of the mid-fifth century; their 
removal from that landscape might be seen as an equally loaded move.42 
 Perhaps the most interesting thing about the Thirty’s attempt to reshape 
the record of Athens’ past, however, is the fact that it seems not to have 
worked. One reason that we know that some decrees were taken down in 
404/3 is because some later decrees allude to this fact. The acts of destruction 
were, in other words, doubly unsuccessful: the destroyed decrees were 
restored, and all the Thirty managed to do was find themselves inscribed into 
Athenian (and modern scholarly) collective memory as epigraphic vandals.43 
But it is possible to do more with these monuments than simply to use them 
as evidence for the ineptitude of oligarchs. First, it is worth exploring the 
reasons for (and consequences of) the commemoration of the Thirty’s actions 
in the later inscriptions. The material is frustratingly fragmentary, but some 
patterns do emerge. It is worth emphasising the plural—patterns—here: 
although these restored proxeny decrees are sometimes piled together into a 
single commemorative heap, in fact, they show considerable diversity in what 
they record, what they omit, and how they represent their relationship with 
their destroyed original. 
 Some fourth-century proxeny decrees include the destruction of an earlier 
award in their list of factors which justify the creation of a new award. IG II2 
52, for example, awards proxenia to the grandsons of Xanthippos: the Thirty 
had done something to the inscription recording the proxeny of the 
grandfather (destruction seems a plausible restoration); the function of this 
decree is not to reactivate the grandfather’s status, but rather to reward his 
grandsons.44 Likewise, Agora 16.37 awards proxeny to some citizens of Ialysos 
 
40 See further below, p. 253. 
41 For proxenia as a tool of imperialism, see Meiggs (1949). Mack (2015) 94–5 notes that 
instances of destruction of inscribed proxeny decrees appear to have been relatively rare, 
and restricted to contexts of political revolution (as in the Athenian examples discussed here, 
and a comparable case in Hellenistic Priene, reinscribed as I.Priene2 27). 
42 Lambert (2011) 201. Evidence for the Thirty’s more general awareness of the 
importance of monuments to political messages comes in the story that they changed the 
orientation of the Pnyx to encourage speakers to pay less attention to the sea (and, by 
extension, the navy, the empire and democracy): Plut. Them. 19.4. See further Shear (2011) 
175–80. 
43 As, e.g., in Walbank (1978) 8–9; Wolpert (2002) 87–8.  
44 It is possible that the original decree is the one recorded on IG I3 177 (Walbank (1978) 
no. 63; cautiously followed by Lambert (2012) 266), although the relative dates of the two 
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in Rhodes, and again notes in doing so that the decree which awarded the 
same status to their father had been destroyed (in this case the reference to 
destruction is definitely on the stone; the reference to the Thirty is restored, 
though not implausibly).45 The connection between contemporary concerns 
and the shaping (or re-shaping) of the record of the past is not hard to spot 
here: in order to justify the claim to honours by the new generation of 
proxenoi, the new decrees must remind the Athenians of the previous services 
performed by the honorands’ families; that they are able to do so by flagging 
up the oligarchs’ hostility to the honorands’ ancestors (and therefore, by 
implication, the ancestors’ loyalty to the Athenian demos) might be considered 
an additional bonus. 
 How important is the original decree, and the original monument, to the 
creation of these stories of sustained loyalty to Athens? The short answer to 
this question is that, at times, it seems to be absolutely central; at others, 
entirely disposable. A longer answer requires a closer look at two subsets of 
this material. 
 The first set is a group of stelae which include (at least) two decrees on each 
stone.46 Each example contains a fourth-century decree which (it is inferred: 
the relevant part of the decree is missing in each case) authorised the re-
publication of a fifth-century decree; that older text is inscribed on the same 
stone, either above or below the fourth century decree.47 In one case, IG I3 
229, enough survives of the fourth-century decree to make it reasonably safe 
 
decrees might argue against this: IG I3 177 is dated to the late 410s; the revived decree, 
presumably passed shortly after 403, transfers the honour to the grandsons of Xanthippus 
(line 4) rather than his sons: it is not impossible that a man honoured in the 410s might have 
adult grandsons but no adult sons c. ten years later, but not overwhelmingly likely either. 
45 The exact date of the decree is unclear (it is usually placed some time in the first decade 
of the fourth century), and it is therefore also impossible to know what particular factors 
might have inspired the reactivation of the proxeny relationship (for discussion, see Funke 
(1983) 169–74). The context for the award of proxeny to the honorands’ father is also unclear: 
Ialysos was a tribute-paying member of the Athenian Empire (for brief details: Hansen and 
Nielsen (2004) 1199), and Rhodian forces were present (on the Athenian side) in the Sicilian 
Expedition (Thuc. 7.57.6); Ialysos defected from the Empire in 411 (Thuc. 8.44.1–2). 
46 There are three (relatively) safe examples of this type: IG I3 227 (≈ IG II2 8; for 
Herakleides of Clazomenae); IG I3 228 (≈ IG II2 32; for the Sicels Archonides and Demon); 
and IG I3 229 (≈ IG ii2 9; the names and origin of the honorands are not preserved). Possibly 
to be included in this group is ML 80/OR 173 (for Pythophanes, probably of Carystos): two 
decrees, one of c. 411 and one of 399/8, are inscribed on the same stele, but it is unclear 
whether these were inscribed at the same time (in 399/8, in which case the monument serves 
as a republication of the earlier decree) or whether the later decree was added as a 
supplement to an existing monument (D. M. Lewis (ap. de Ste. Croix (1956) 19) suggested 
that it might be possible to detect a change in letter-cutter between the two decrees; for 
discussion of the implications of this, see Mack (2015) 96). 
47 Below the fourth-century decree in three cases (IG I3 227, 228, and [probably] 229); 
above it in ML 80/OR 173. 
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to reconstruct a reference to the destruction of the previous monument by 
the Thirty.  
 A notable feature of some, and perhaps all, of this set of decrees is that 
they were passed not by the demos but by the boule (the questionable example 
is IG I3 227, where the relevant part of the prescript is not extant). Various 
explanations for this oddity have been proposed, but the most likely is that 
that the boule’s approval is sufficient here because what is being enacted is not 
a whole new decree, but simply the process for creating a replacement 
monument for a decree which had been properly approved on a previous 
occasion and—a necessary inference, if this line of reasoning is correct—
whose validity had never lapsed.48 It is worth digressing briefly to consider 
the significance of this point, particularly because it seems to contradict the 
theory (outlined earlier) that removing a monument was seen as equivalent 
to invalidating the decree which it recorded (a logic which, we could note, 
also seems to have underpinned the Thirty’s destructive acts, at least 
according to the Ath. Pol.). I would suggest that the best way to explain this 
apparent exception to the general rule is by emphasising the exceptional 
nature both of the Thirty’s regime, and of the Athenians’ response to it. 
Demosthenes (24.56) claims that all acts carried out by the Thirty were 
deemed invalid by the restored democracy, and it is quite possible (although 
admittedly not made explicit by Demosthenes) that this ruling would have 
applied not just to creative acts (new laws, for example), but also to 
destructive ones (that is: attempts to repeal existing decrees). And it is possible 
too, given what we have seen so far about the importance of collective (and 
democratic) approval for the destruction of decrees, that the destructions of 
the Thirty (who would, necessarily, lack that approval) were thought to have 
no formal force. In this case, therefore, the destruction of the monument did 
not entail the annulment of the decree. 
 If this line of argument is correct, then it would follow that these fourth 
century bouleutic decrees are not creating new regulations, but simply re-
establishing a physical record of a decree of the demos which was still in force. 
This interpretation seems to fit with what is done (or—more to the point—
not done) with the re-created texts of the fifth-century decrees, which, as far 
as it is possible to tell, are repeated absolutely verbatim: amendments in the 
fifth-century parts of IG I3 227 and 228 are preserved in the re-inscribed 
versions (lines 14–25 and lines 19–25 respectively); anachronistic references 
to the ‘cities over which the Athenians have kratos’ are retained (IG I3 228, 
lines 10–11). Although the move to recreate these decrees is clearly driven by 
contemporary needs, the focus on the present goes only so far. In particular, 
it does not allow the originally (and collectively) authorised version of past 
events to be amended, even though some of these fifth-century views of the 
 
48 For discussion of this and other possibilities, see Rhodes (1985) 82–4. 
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world (and Athens’ role in it) might look rather out of place in their new 
fourth-century context. 
 How, then, should we read these monuments? Or—more to the point—
how should we assume that the Athenians read them? We cannot, certainly, 
ignore the practical function of the inscriptions, not least from the point of 
view of the honorands: an award of proxeny did not require an inscribed 
monument, but an inscription did form an important part of the honour.49 It 
is very likely that the initiative for creating these new monuments came (at 
least initially) not from the Athenians but from the honorands: this is implied 
by the variation of the form of the monuments;50 the fact that funding for the 
restored monument might from the honorands rather than the Athenian 
state;51 and, above all, the fact that the dates of reconstruction seem to cover 
a period of around two decades.52 It would, in other words, be a mistake to 
imagine the restored democracy engaging in a systematic (or even sustained) 
programme of re-establishing the record of their past actions, or of 
championing their victory over the oligarchic challenge to those actions.53 
Nevertheless, the part played by the Athenians cannot be ignored: they 
might not have taken the lead in restoring the monuments, but they surely 
had a say in their form. The verbatim repetition of the earlier decree is a 
deliberate choice (and not an inevitable one);54 and the same applies to the 
reference to the Thirty.55  
 
49 Walbank (1978) 3–4; Lambert (2011) 199–200. 
50 See above, n. 47, for variations in the content and layout of the inscriptions. All the 
examples in this set are extremely fragmentary, so it is not possible to say how much about 
their overall physical form; the only fully preserved revived proxeny decree is IG II2 6, 
discussed below. 
51 This is explicit in Agora 16.37 (lines 13–14). Walbank (1978) 261, suggests that IG I3 227 
was also funded by the honorand (but concedes that the payment clause would have to be 
entirely restored). The funding formula in the other examples is either missing or not 
preserved. 
52 Only one example is both a certain case of reconstruction and has a certain date: IG 
I3 228, dated to 385/4. The later decree on ML 80/OR 173 is securely dated to 399/8, but 
(as noted above, n. 46), it is not clear whether the earlier decree on the stone was also 
inscribed at this point. Plausible dates for the other examples range from shortly after 403 
to the 380s. 
53 Cf. the more systematic democratic re-appropriation of other aspects of monumental 
and epigraphic space, particularly in the Agora, argued for by Shear (2011), esp. chs. 8 and 9. 
54 See below, pp. 254–7. 
55 A counterexample: the honours for loyal Samians (IG II2 1) were almost certainly 
destroyed by the Thirty and re-inscribed by the democracy, on a similar pattern to these 
proxeny decrees (that is, verbatim repetition of a fifth-century original, supplemented with 
[in this case] two new fourth-century decrees), but the monument makes no reference to 
either its reconstruction or its destruction. Another counterexample (this time illustrating 
the possibility of a more detailed account of the destruction of a monument as part of the 
justification for its reconstruction) comes in the honours for Euphron of Sicyon (IG II2 448) 
which were passed (and originally inscribed) in 323/2, removed by the oligarchy some time 
between 321/0 and 319/18, and re-inscribed, together with a new decree, by the restored 
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 Overall, this set of restored proxeny decrees seem to fit quite well into the 
wider pattern of the Athenian response to the rule of the Thirty: that is, an 
approach (to borrow Wolpert’s term) of ‘mindful forgetfulness’.56 On the one 
hand, there is an urge (reflected in, though not completely determined by, 
the terms of the amnesty) to write the episode out of Athenian memory 
altogether, and to create a seamless join between the democracy of the fifth 
century and that of the fourth.57 Such a move has the advantage of emphasis-
ing continuity, and the solidarity of the Athenian demos: what seemed good 
to the Athenians in the fifth century still seemed good in the fourth; so much 
so that the renewed authorisation of the demos for these acts is not even 
required. But this approach has the disadvantage of letting the Thirty off the 
hook; it is a reluctance to allow this which might explain the reference to the 
actions of the Thirty in (at least some of) these texts. The reference, when it 
appears, is brief and plain, in contrast to some other memorials of this period. 
Aeschines reports a much more charged description of the Thirty which 
(allegedly) was inscribed on the honours for the heroes of Phyle (3.190):  
 
τούσδ’ ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα στεφάνοις ἐγέραιρε παλαίχθων 
 δῆµος Ἀθηναίων, οἵ ποτε τοὺς ἀδίκοις 
θεσµοῖς ἄρξαντας πόλιος πρῶτοι καταπαύειν 
 ἦρξαν, κίνδυνον σώµασιν ἀράµενοι. 
 
These men, noble of heart, hath the ancient Athenian people / 
Crowned with an olive crown. First were they to oppose / Tyrants who 
knew not the laws, whose rule was the rule of injustice. / Danger they 
met unafraid, pledging their lives to the cause. (Trans. Adams.) 
 
If the Theozotides decree (SEG 28.46) can still be dated to 403/2, then this 
would also provide an example of a characterisation of the Thirty’s actions 
which did not avoid spelling out the nature of their atrocities (in its talk, at 
lines 4–5, of the [β]ιαίʖ|ωι θανάτωι, ‘violent death’, suffered by the 
democrats).58 In these proxeny decrees, by contrast, we hear just enough 
about the Thirty to remind us of their existence (and their actions); the focus 
of attention remains on the unbroken authority of the Athenian people.  
 Once again, however, it is clear that the Athenian approach is not 
completely consistent, and a second set of evidence—a set with only one 
 
democracy in 318/17 (lines 60–73 describe the process of destruction and reconstruction in 
some detail). 
56 Wolpert (2002) 87–98. 
57 Loraux (1996) 88–9; Shear (2011) 257–9. 
58 The decree refers (line 5) to the ὀλιγαρχία, but it is unclear whether this is a reference 
to the regime of 404/3 (suggested in the ed. pr. by Stroud (1971) 286–7, and widely accepted 
since) or that of 411 (the case for which has most recently been made by Matthaiou (2011) 
71–81). 
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definite member—points to the possibility of handling things rather 
differently. The inscription relates to the claims to proxeny of five brothers, 
sons of a certain Apemantos, probably from Thasos (OR 177B, IG II2 6):59 
 
θεοί 
[Ἀµύντο]ρος, Εὐρυπύλο, vac. 
[Ἀργεί]ο, Λόκρο, Ἀλκίµο. vac. 
[ἔδοξ]εν τῆι βολῆι· Οἰνηῒς 
[ἐπρυ]τάνευε, ∆εξίθεος ἐγ- 
[ραµ]µάτευε, ∆ηµοκλῆς ἐπε- 
[σ]τάτε· Μονιππίδης εἶπε· Ἀ- 
µύντορι καὶ Εὐρυπύλωι κ- 
αὶ Ἀργείωι καὶ Λόκρωι κα- 
ὶ Ἀλκίµωι τοῖς Ἀπηµάντο 
παισί, ἐπειδὴ καθηιρέθη 
ἡ στήλη [ἐ]πὶ τῶν τριάκοντ- 
α ἐν ἧι ἦ[ν α]ὐτοῖς ἡ προξεν- 
ία, ἀναγράψ[αι] τὴν στήλην 
τὸγ γραµµα[τ]έα τῆς βολῆς 
τέλεσι τοῖς Εὐρυπύλο· κα- 
λέσαι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ξένια Εὐ- 
ρύπυλον ἐς τὸ πρυτανεῖο- 
ν ἐς αὔριον vac. 
 
Gods. Of Amyntor, Eurypylos, Argeios, Lokros, Alkimos. It seemed 
good to the Boule. Oineis held the prytany, Dexitheos was Secretary, 
Demokles presided, Monippides made the proposal. For Amyntor, 
Eurypylos, Argeios, Lokros, Alkimos, the sons of Apemantos, since the 
stele was taken down in the time of the Thirty, in which their proxeny 
(was recorded), let the Secretary of the Boule write up the stele at the 
expense of Eurypylos; and let Eurypylos be invited to dinner at the 
prytaneion tomorrow. 
 
This is the best-preserved of all the examples of this type of monument, a fact 
which allows us to see a striking gap in what is recorded. The monument 
 
59 The Thasian identity of the honorands is not stated in the text, but is inferred from 
the fact that one (and perhaps two) of the men named in the inscription can reasonably 
securely be identified with known Thasians: Apemantus (line 10) is named in IG XII.8 263, 
line 8 as having had his property confiscated by the Thasian oligarchic regime in 411; a son 
of Apemantus (restored, on the basis of a surviving final rho, as Amyntor) appears in IG II2 
33, line 26, in a list of men exiled from Thasos for attikismos (Walbank (1978) no. 61; Pouilloux 
(1954) 145; Avery (1979) 240–1 adds the appealing if speculative suggestion that the family’s 
well-known pro-democratic/anti-oligarchic stance was the reason that their stele was 
earmarked for destruction by the Thirty). 
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reports a decree of the boule, noting the destruction (by the Thirty) of an 
earlier monument, and authorising the creation of a new stele, to be set up at 
the expense of one of the brothers, Eurypylos. But the decree does not do 
either of the other things which we might (on the basis of the examples seen 
so far) expect: unlike IG II2 52 or Agora 16.37, there is no explicitly-stated new 
(or renewed) award of proxeny (although the invitation to dinner at the 
prytaneion does, implicitly, place Eurypylos, at least, in the position of a 
euergetes to the city).60 Nor, unlike in IG I3 227 or 228, is there any sign of the 
original, fifth-century text. The stone is broken at the top, but the fact that 
the first extant line (preceded by 9 cm of vacant space) is the invocation to 
the gods (θεοί) suggests that no preceding text has been lost; the end of the 
text is also followed by uninscribed space (of 33 cm). There is no obvious sign 
that another monument (bearing the other decree) was attached to the stone 
which we have. The most economical interpretation would therefore seem 
to be that the fifth-century decree was never re-inscribed: the restored stele to 
which this text refers (in line 14) is (precisely, and only) this stele. It seems, 
therefore, that these five Thasians (who, after all, were funding the inscrip-
tion (line 16), and so might have expected to have some influence over its 
form) considered that this level of recognition was sufficient for their pur-
poses: the existence of a monument seems to have been more important to 
them than the public display of a complete, and fully-authorised decree. 
 It is impossible to know what prompted the Thasians to make this choice 
(or the Athenians to accept it), though here too it must be important to 
remember the series of negotiations which must lie behind the creation of 
the stone, and its creation in this form: the initiative for the recreation must 
have come from the Thasians; they presumably found a way to persuade 
Monippides to make the proposal to the Council;61 the Council was prepared 
to accept the suggestion; the secretary to put the plan into action. All of this 
combines to produce something which might, to modern eyes, seem quite 
arbitrary or capricious, but is in fact likely to be the logical result of the 
specific intentions and requirements of the various parties involved in 
creating this monument.  
 It might, though, be possible to get a bit further in speculating about the 
consequences of this commemorative action. This stele produces a picture of 
the recent past which is significantly different in its emphasis from the other 
restored proxeny decrees which have been discussed. Two things are 
missing. First (obviously) we lack the earlier decree, and with it that sense of 
unbroken continuity with the past which was a feature of at least some of the 
other restored decrees. The second absence is any explicit function for the 
 
60 Henry (1983) 262 observes that benefactors are one of two categories to whom the 
honour of a (single) invitation to dinner is regularly (although not universally) awarded (the 
other being ambassadors and envoys). 
61 Monippides is otherwise unknown, other than as the (highly, and speculatively, re-
stored) proposer of another honorific decree, IG II2 7. 
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demos in creating or authorising this monument, or even (in contrast to the 
normal pattern of proxeny decrees) in serving as the beneficiaries of the 
honorands’ actions. By removing the Athenians (or at least the Athenian 
demos) from the picture, the monument creates a direct link between the 
Thirty and the Thasians—or, more accurately, between the Thirty and these 
five individuals. Whatever the actual role of these Thasians in the events of 
404/3, the form of this monument allows them to insert themselves directly 
into the story, and the communally agreed memory, of the oligarchic coup 
and its aftermath. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
When looking at Athenian inscribed decrees en masse, or even as individual 
examples, it can be tempting to see them as very fixed, authoritative (even 
authoritarian) symbols of commemoration, created, endorsed, and set up by 
the Athenian state. The collective aspect of Athenian inscribed decrees is, of 
course, a central part of their function, but, as I have tried to show, these 
monuments are also fundamentally informed, both in their creation and in 
their subsequent use, by the commemorative intentions of individuals and 
groups of individuals. The role of the individual—as decree proposer—in 
prompting the creation of an inscribed monument, and (to some extent) in 
shaping its content is clearly visible in the inscribed text itself. What the 
treatment of inscriptions after their creation reveals is that this interaction 
between individual and community was not a one-off, nor a one-way, action, 
but rather a process which continued throughout the life of an inscribed 
monument. Moreover, this approach is visible not only in the treatment of 
inscribed decrees, but also in relation to other forms of inscribed public text 
(catalogues, for example, and dedications). Athenian treatment of their 
inscriptions reveals not only the (not particularly striking, though not entirely 
uncontested) fact that individual Athenians did see and respond to these 
monuments, but also, more importantly, that these individual responses 
could in turn lead to reshaping of the collectively-agreed record: an 
inscription could be removed, emended, reconstructed, or entirely replaced; 
in the process, the picture of the city’s past which the inscription implicitly 
or explicitly recorded was reshaped. What we can glimpse in the treatment 
of these monuments, in other words, is something of the dynamism of 
collective memory. 
 More elusive, but also important, is the insight this material provides into 
the relationship between inscriptions and other sources of collective (and 
indeed individual) memory. Some of these other sources might have been 
written, but were written in forms no longer available to us. (It seems quite 
likely, for example, that the honorands of the inscriptions destroyed by the 
Thirty had access to alternative copies of the original decrees, whether in the 
Athenian archive or in their own collections.) But the overall pattern of 
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behaviour described here makes sense only if the Athenians could also draw 
on a wider body of shared, but unwritten, beliefs about their recent, or even 
(as in the case of Arthmius of Zeleia) quite distant past. Inscribed monuments 
were not always the definitive source of accurate information about the 
collectively-agreed version of the past, and seem in at least some cases (for 
example, the stele of the Athenian treaty with Alexander) to have derived 
some of their symbolic importance from the fact that they provided a picture 
of the past which contradicted an agreed, but unwritten alternative. Even 
when monuments were less obviously out of step with the ‘reality’ of 
Athenian views, their depiction of the past is often comprehensible only if it 
can be assumed that the viewer was able to fill in the gaps in what is 
recorded—literally in the case of some acts of erasure; metaphorically in the 
case of the highly compressed references to the behaviour of the Thirty. 
 Inscribed decrees, without doubt, played an important part in the 
formation of Athenian collective memory, but we should be wary of 
assuming that the memories which they produced were at all stable: as we 
have seen, the same monument could be deployed to justify quite different 
versions of the past. We should also be wary of assuming that the movement 
from individual memory to collective commemoration was either smooth or 
absolute. What we can see in these monuments, and particularly in their 
destruction and reconstruction, is the flexibility not just of Athenian views of 
their past, but also of Athenian ways of representing, reshaping, and, at 
times, deliberately concealing those views. 
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Appendix: Destroyed, Amended and Restored Inscriptions Discussed in this Chapter 
Note: all inscriptions are Athenian, except where stated otherwise;  
each list is ordered (as far as possible) by the date of the creation of the inscribed monument. 
 
1. Destruction or Removal 
Inscription Description Date of Creation Evidence for Destruction 
Not extant Laws of Solon, 
Ephialtes, Archestratus  
Laws: C6th/C5th.  
Inscribed monument: 
not known. 
‘Taken down’ by the Thirty Tyrants: Ath. Pol. 35.2. 
Not extant Inscribed (gold) 
dedications on the 
Athenian Acropolis 
Not specified Dem. 22.70, 72: alleges that the dedications were 
destroyed by Androtion. 
Not extant  Proxeny (?) decree 
(names of honorands not 
preserved) 
Before 403 IG I3 229 (≈ IG II2 9): refers to the destruction by the 
Thirty Tyrants of an earlier stele. 
Not extant Proxeny decree for the 
sons of Apemantos 
Before 403 IG II2 6 (OR 177B): refers to the destruction by the 
Thirty Tyrants of an earlier stele recording a proxeny.  
Perhaps IG I3 177? Proxeny decree for 
Xanthippos 
Before 403 IG II2 52 (proxeny decree for grandson of Xanthip-
pos): refers to destruction by the Thirty Tyrants of 
the grandfather’s proxeny as motivation for this 
decree. 
Not extant Proxeny decree for 
Anon. of Kaphyai 
(Arcadia) 
Before 403 IG II2 66c: very fragmentary decree referring to 
destruction of a stele by the Thirty Tyrants. 
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Not extant Proxeny decree for 
Anon. of Ialysos 
Before 403 Agora 16.37: renewal of a proxeny held by the 
honorand’s father; the earlier stele was destroyed by 
the Thirty Tyrants. 
Not extant Proxeny decree? Before 403 Agora 16.39: very fragmentary, but seems to preserve a 
reference to destruction of a previous decree. 
Not extant Thasos: decree relating 
to exile/civil war 
Late C5th IG XII.8 264: reconciliation decree, including 
(fragmentary) reference to the removal of (an earlier?) 
decree. 
Not extant Athenian alliance with 
Alexander of Pherae 
368 RO 44, lines 39–40 (361/0): orders removal of the 
treaty stele.  
Not extant Peace of Philocrates 346 Philochorus, BNJ 328 F 55a: removal ordered in 
decree of Demosthenes (340/39).   
Not extant 
(postulated as a lost 
part of RO 83) 
Eresos: law concerning 
tyranny. 
c. 356–336 RO 83, γ, lines 24–6: refers to a law prohibiting 
removal of a stele (RO 83, α?) recording decisions 
made about the tyrants and their descendants. 
CID 2.73 Delphi: list of those ex-
pelled from the city dur-
ing the 3rd Sacred War  
Mid C4th Found in an archaeological context which suggests 
that the monument was destroyed c. 322. 
Not extant  Megalopolitan alliance 
with Thebes 
Mid C4th Dem. 16.27–8 urges the destruction of the treaty stele. 
RO 80 Delphi: honours for Ar-
istotle and Callisthenes 
337–327 Ael. VH 14.1: honours rescinded 322 (or later); 
destruction inferred from findspot. 
Agora 16.114 Honours for Demetrius 
Poliorcetes 
304/3 Livy 31.44.4–5 reports damnatio of Antigonids, 
200/199; destruction of this stele inferred from 
findspot. 
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Not extant Priene: proxeny decree 
for Euandros of Larisa 
Late C4th/early 
C3rd? 
I.Priene2 27, lines 1–2: implies that an original stele 
recording the award of proxeny had been destroyed. 
 
 
2. Emendations and Alterations 
Inscription  Description Date of creation Notes 
ML 27 Delphi: Serpent 
Column 
479/8 Illicit addition of epigram by Pausanias; removal of 
epigram (and addition of names of states who fought 
Persia) by Spartans (Thuc. 1.132) or Delphic 
Amphictyony ([Dem.] 59.98). 
ML 63/OR 149A Alliance with Rhegion 433/2 Original prescript erased. 
ML 64/OR 149B Alliance with Leontini 433/2 Original prescript erased. 
Not extant Peace of Nicias 421 Thuc. 5.56.3: amended to note Spartan breach of 
terms, 419. 
Not extant Inscription (perhaps 
financial and/or reli-
gious?) relating to/ 
mentioning Timanthes  
Before 409/8 IG I3 106, lines 21–3, orders that a section of 
inscription relating to Timanthes be erased. 
Not extant List of Selymbrian 
hostages 
c. 408/7 ML 87/OR 185, lines 38–41 orders the removal of 
names from the list. 
ML 89/OR 187 Honours for Neapolis Monument: c. 407 
(containing decrees of 
410/9 and c. 407). 
Erasure of description of Neapolitans as colonists of 
the Thasians (authorised at lines 58–60). 
RO 22 Prospectus of the Sec-
ond Athenian League 
378/7 Multiple additions and deletions, between 378/7 and 
c. 367. 
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RO 31 Decrees for Mytilene 369/8–368/7 First decree is inscribed over an erasure. 
IG II2 1606 Naval catalogue 374/3 Timotheus’ office (strategos) erased (but not his name). 
RO 48 Alliance with Carystus 357/6 Chabrias’ (?) name erased. 
Not extant Honorific deme decree 
for Euxitheus 
Mid-C4th Dem. 57.64 (delivered c. 345) implies that the entire 
decree has been erased (but not that the stele has been 
removed). 
IG XII.2 1 Mytilene: monetary 
union between Mytilene 
and Phocaea 
Mid-C4th? Provision to supplement/erase the text, if either side 
wishes to amend the agreement. 
 
3. Re-inscription 
Inscription Description Date(s) of creation Notes 
IG II2 1 Honours for Samos Monument: 404/3 
(containing two 
decrees of 404/3 and 
one of 405/4) 
A dossier of decrees; the decree of 405/4 had perhaps 
been destroyed by the Thirty Tyrants (but this is not 
stated explicitly). 
IG I3 229 (≈ IG II2 9) Proxeny (?) decree 
(names of honorands 
not preserved) 
Monument: early 
C4th (containing two 
decrees; date and 
relationship unclear) 
Refers to the destruction by the Thirty Tyrants of an 
earlier stele.  
IG I3 227 (≈ IG II2 8) Proxeny decrees for 
Heracleides of 
Clazomenae 
Monument: c. 399–
386 (containing 
decrees of c. 424/3 
and c. 399–386) 
The stone contains two decrees: one decree (the 
lower on the stone) is a fourth-century re-inscription 
of a fifth-century decree; the other is almost entirely 
lost, but might have been the C4th decree authorising 
the re-inscription of the earlier text. 
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ML 80/OR 173 Proxeny decree for 
Pythophanes 
Monument: 411/10–
399/8 or 399/8 
(containing decrees of 
411/10 and 399/8) 
Unclear if this is a re-inscription or supplement. The 
stone contains two decrees: the first on the stone is a 
fifth-century decree; only the heading of the second is 
preserved. It is not clear if the decrees were inscribed 
separately (at the time each one was passed), or 
together (in 399/8). 
IG I3 228 (≈ IG II2 
32) 
Proxeny decree for 
Archonides and Demon, 
Sicels 
Monument: 385/4 
(containing decrees of 
c. 435–410 and 385/4) 
C4th decree of the Boule (or probouleuma?): only its 
heading is extant.  In the lower part of the 
monument, a re-inscription of an earlier (C5th?) 
proxeny decree.  
IG II2 448 Honours for Euphron of 
Sicyon 
Monument: 318/17 
(containing decrees of 
323/2 and 318/7) 
The decree of 318/17 notes that the decree of 323/2 
(re-inscribed here) had been destroyed by the 
oligarchic regime in Sicyon. 
I.Priene2 27 Priene: proxeny decree 
for Euandros of Larisa  
Monument: first half 
of C3rd (containing 
decrees of late 
C4th/early C3rd and 
first half of C3rd) 
The first decree on the stone re-authorises (and 
extends) the honours previously awarded; the original 
proxeny decree is re-inscribed beneath. 
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